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Jack Holland, draft version of:  
From Void to Crisis: From September 11
th
 2001 to 9-11 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter marks the start of the substantive analysis of how the ÔWar on TerrorÕ 
was possible.  It assesses the role of foreign policy discourse in the immediate post 9-
11 period, through a consideration of the notions ÔvoidÕ and ÔcrisisÕ.  It does so by 
exploring the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 and the start of the ÔWar on 
TerrorÕ in the unique American context.  The chapter focuses on the interplay of the 
cultural and discursive context with the (perceived) events themselves, as well as the 
agency of politicians and the public to generate meaning. The simple fact that the 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ was begun in the United States is an important reminder of the 
significance of the American context.  The events of 9-11 took place in the US and 
the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was born through the words of politicians situated within (a 
uniquely stunned) American society.  The decision that faced British and Australian 
practitioners was not whether to launch a ÔWar on TerrorÕ, but whether or not to join 
the US-led coalition.  As the principal member of the coalition, founder of the ÔWar 
on TerrorÕ and location of the Ôterrorist attackÕ that inspired it, the unique American 
experience after 9-11 requires elaboration if we are to understand how the ÔWar on 
TerrorÕ was possible. 
 
This chapter does not follow the comparative approach of subsequent chapters.  It 
does however move us towards an understanding of how the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was 
possible and facilitates the comparative analysis that follows.  Here, it is simply not 
possible to explore public reactions in the UK and Australia way as the US as the data 
simply does not exist.  Limited limited insights can be drawn from media and 
(archived) internet sources (alongside official language) to indicate that such an 
exploration might not necessary.  Although shocking, Britons and Australians did not 
experience the events of 11 September 2001 in equally personal or incomprehensible 
ways.
1
  Instead, as the following chapter will argue, the British response articulated 
                                                
1
 See, for example, the British National Archives internet archive; the Australian National Archives 
Pandora Archive; and archived material in the Library of Congress ÔWitness and ResponseÕ collection. 
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that the scale of 9-11 was shocking, rather than the existence of terrorism or the 
successful striking of a Western nation.  This can be understood in respect of a British 
foreign policy culture that is familiar with the experience of terrorism in a way that 
the US is not.
2
  Thus, in Britain, an existing language for comprehending terrorism 
ensured a highly mediated ÔvoidÕ.
3
  Similarly, in Australia, 9-11 was ÔreadÕ through a 
longstanding Hobbesian geographical imagination: 9-11 was further proof that the 
world beyond Australian borders was dangerous.  For Australians, having recently 
survived the Asian financial crisis and intervention in East Timor, 9-11 was the latest 
ÔshockÕ to the West and the Anglosphere of which Australia was intimately a part.  
These differences are picked up on in chapter 5, where we return to a comparative 
empirical investigation.  Here, however, it is imperative to investigate the complex 
relationship between American politicians, the media and society with regards to the 
events of 11 September 2001.  The ÔWar on TerrorÕ was, after all, born in these 
moments in this state. 
 
This chapter attempts to ÔsoftenÕ the hard break in history that official foreign policy 
discourse has written into Ô9-11Õ, whilst taking seriously the ethical task of 
recognising the experiences and voices of Ôordinary AmericansÕ.  The chapter begins 
by introducing the terms ÔvoidÕ and ÔcrisisÕ, addressing some important if misplaced 
criticisms of the former, and restating the centrality of issues of agency, resonance 
and culture to the analysis.  The chapter is subsequently organised around the 
moments of ÔvoidÕ and ÔcrisisÕ.  The first half of the chapter investigates and theorises 
the nature of the post 9-11 ÔvoidÕ in two principal stages.  Firstly, the investigation of 
the ÔvoidÕ begins by exploring the unusually personal nature of 9-11 and the possible 
reasons it may have both been experienced as such at the time and constructed as such 
afterwards.  Secondly, the theorisation of the ÔvoidÕ continues by considering the pre-
existing ÔtruthsÕ of American security culture that were seemingly shattered on the 
morning of 11 September 2001.  This half of the chapter thus explores the American 
contextual (cultural) condition Ð characterised by a lack of organising discourses Ð in 
which the official and successful narration of 9-11 would occur.  I ague that the void 
                                                
2
 See, for example, Kleinfeld, ÔStrategic TropingÕ and Erjavec, K., and Volcic, Z. ÔÒWar on TerrorismÓ 
as a Discursive Battleground: Serbian Recontextualization of G.W BushÕs DiscourseÕ, Discourse and 
Society, 18:2, (2007), pp.123-37 on processes of ÔcontextualisationÕ in Sri Lanka and Serbia. 
3
 See also, Kleinfeld, ÔStrategic TropingÕ, on the pre-existence of language capable of subsuming the 
events of 9-11. 
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was characterised by a lack of harmonised meaning in the immediate aftermath of 11 
September 2001, due to the failure of language and a particular American cultural 
context.  Where partial meanings were achieved they were often highly 
individualised, with viewers frequently drawing on popular cultural sources and latent 
understandings. 
 
Having explored the ÔnatureÕ of the void, its impact is assessed.  It is argued that the 
discursive vacuum not only heightened the significance of attempts to frame foreign 
policy, but also that the ÔnatureÕ of the void enabled, shaped and constrained attempts 
by politicians and the media to frame events.  Crucially, the initial 
incomprehensibility that characterised the void was seized upon as 9-11 went from 
being incomprehensible to inexplicable.  The second half of the chapter thus considers 
the first stage of the framing process Ð the construction of 9-11 as crisis Ð drawing on 
the work of Jenny Edkins, Stuart Croft, Colin Hay and Gerard Toal.  It is argued that 
through the construction of crisis Ð through a decisive intervention that re-established 
ÔpoliticsÕ over Ôthe politicalÕ Ð the events of 11 September 2001 became Ô9-11Õ, 
whereby 9-11 serves as a somatic marker of crisis.  As a somatic marker, Ô9-11Õ 
circumvents possibilities for critical reflection or debate, bringing to the fore a range 
of highly reductive tacit geopolitical assumptions and arguments. That 9-11 might 
seem self-evidently to be a moment or marker of crisis is something that must be 
made strange.  In tracing and theorising the shift from void to crisis, this section thus 
serves to denaturalise the first and prerequisite stage of the response to 9-11, enabling 
an understanding of how the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was possible and opening a critical 
space for its contestation.
4
   
 
 
                                                
4
 The chapter draws extensively on quotations taken from interviews Ð held in the Library of CongressÕ 
Folklife CenterÕs ÔWitness and Response CollectionÕ and ÔSeptember 11, 2001, ArchiveÕ Ð that were 
conducted with ÔwitnessesÕ in the days and weeks after 9-11.These interviews were conducted by an 
extensive network of amateur, semi-professional and professional folklorists, ethnographers and 
anthropologists throughout the US.  They detail the experiences of the US general public from 11 
September 2001 to 1 November 2002.  The collection extends well beyond November, but this paper 
focuses on the early stages of the framing process and the thoughts of the US general public.  While it 
should be noted that, of course, the sample does not claim to represent a cross-section of US citizens, a 
demographically, socially and geographically diverse range of interviewees are represented.  
Interviewers were contacted by the Library of Congress Folklife Center, using the same model that was 
implemented after Pearl Harbor in an attempt to document the feelings, thoughts and opinions of the 
general public.  All direct quotations are taken from the collection, with references given to the cassette 
number in the Library of Congress catalogue.   
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Time and 9-11 
 
There are two common responses to 9-11.  Firstly, the notion that 9-11 was a date on 
which everything changed.
5
  Secondly, the notion that 9-11 was a date on which 
nothing changed at all.
6
  Time then seems to be central to thinking and talking about 
9-11, even when temporal conceptualisations are left implicit.  These two antecedent 
tendencies are prevalent amongst both the official responses of practitioners and 
media framings but also in the reflections of academic analyses.
7
  However, for the 
vast majority of the US general public in the wake of 9-11, once the initial confusion 
began to be replaced with harmonised meaning, 9-11 clearly represented a temporal 
rupture.  Noting this, two principal concerns are investigated and addressed 
throughout the chapter.  Firstly, the chapter deals with issues of agency Ð both of 
practitioners and the media but importantly also the general public Ð considering 
issues of framing and resonance in an unusual post 9-11 context that was both 
selective and informing. Secondly, the chapter considers issues of temporality and 
rupture at a cultural and discursive level; the cultural shock and discursive failure 9-
11 induced during the ÔvoidÕ and the strategic writing of temporality in the 
construction of 9-11 as crisis.
8
   
 
The term ÔvoidÕ suggests a ÔphaseÕ and connects to wider debates on the temporality 
of 9-11.  The notion of the ÔvoidÕ represents the immediate post 9-11 confusion 
experienced by the vast majority of ÔviewersÕ as language failed to adequately or 
consistently regulate the meaning of the unfolding events.
9
  It does not imply, as 
critics of the term may suggest, that there existed a total lack of meaning after 9-11.  
Rather, it suggests a lack of homogenised meaning, governed by relatively systematic 
                                                
5
 Frequent references were made to this by foreign policy practitioners.  In his Address to Congress, 
President Bush noted that, on September 11
th
, Ônight fell on a different worldÕ.  Bush, George. W. 
ÔAddress to Joint Session of Congress and the American PeopleÕ, 20 September 2001. 
6
 Time Magazine published explicitly on these two competing interpretations.  A. Sullivan, ÔYes, 
America has changedÕ, and M. Elliott, ÔNo, America has not (thank God)Õ, Time, 1 September 2002. 
7
 For discussion, see, L. Jarvis, ÔTimes of terror: writing temporality into the War on TerrorÕ, Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 1:2, (2008), pp.245-262, at pp.245-246. 
8
 The notion of ÔvoidÕ derives from David CampbellÕs recognition of a Ôvoid in meaningÕ.  It implies a 
lack of homogenised meaning.  As will be argued, fragmented and individualised meanings of 9-11 
were evident during this period, but there existed a void in meaning at a discursive level.  The notion of 
the void should not detract from the multitude of individualised meanings that many viewers initially 
attached to 9-11.  See Campbell, ÔTime is BrokenÕ. 
9
 The term ÔviewersÕ incorporates those who experienced the events either at the scene or on television, 
whether live of repeated. 
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meaning production: a discursive void.  The term also raises the question of 
ÔuniquenessÕ.  Can other events be described as inducing a ÔvoidÕ?  Do all events lead 
to a process of meaning generation that characterises a void, perhaps as a result of 
their inevitable lack of essence?  While other events may generate a void, it is an 
unusual condition requiring the perception of disproved cultural ÔtruthsÕ.  In this, 9-11 
was arguably unique and at the least very unusual.  It was the first time in sixty years 
that Americans had witnessed their vulnerability, at the hands of an external enemy, 
on their own soil.   
 
Although it is possible to state that the void generally began once viewers had 
ÔwitnessedÕ the events, it is not possible to state when the void ended; it ended at 
different times for different people.  For some, it ended abruptly; for others, it was 
replaced slowly as comprehension gradually became possible.  Attempts to fill the 
void, frame events and load 9-11 with meaning began almost immediately as news 
channels ran suggestive rolling headlines.
10
  On the evening of 9-11 President Bush 
delivered his first ÔconsideredÕ articulation of what would become the dominant ÔWar 
on TerrorÕ discourse.  At this time, even Bush was struggling to find the words to 
create a compelling narrative.
11
  By 20 September, however, building on the growing 
and solidifying official response discourse, Bush was able to deliver a crucial and 
compelling framing of 9-11 as crisis, simultaneously filling the events with meaning 
and articulating the solution to the underlying morbid condition they represented.  As 
such articulations began to resonate with the population,
12
 the incomprehensibility of 
9-11 that characterised the void was replaced by the harmonisation and hegemony of 
meaning production that characterised the construction of 9-11 as crisis.  In 
articulating 9-11 as crisis, the act of its construction was erased from memory and the 
void it filled was partially forgotten as it was retrospectively re-imagined. 
 
It is imperative to de-objectify and ÔsoftenÕ the constructed temporality of Ô9-11Õ as 
rupture, revealing the writing of discontinuity that the discursive construction of 9-11 
as crisis entailed.  It is also imperative, however, to question and refute the notion that 
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 See, Lipschultz, ÔFraming TerrorÕ, for discussion and a rebuttal of arguments that claim the media 
led in the narration of 9-11. 
11
 See Frum, The Right Man, p.125. 
12
 As evidenced by the increasingly widespread articulation of official arguments and even the use of 
exact phrases first mobilised by government practitioners. 
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nothing changed on 9-11.  Arguably, to imply such a scenario fails to acknowledge 
the agency of those viewers Ð the US general public Ð who experienced considerable 
trauma on 9-11.  A genealogical approach, tracing discursive continuities from 
ClintonÕs (and earlier presidentsÕ) employment of pre-emptive arguments through to 
the language of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ, would risk overlooking the significance of the 
context that informed the selective and strategic re-articulation of such earlier 
arguments.  This is not to argue that the void was a natural, objective condition.  
Rather it is to argue that the void was an organic cultural condition that logically 
followed from events which existing discourses failed to regulate.  Had US foreign 
policy culture and/or discourse been different, the void may well have not occurred.  
But given the existing US security culture and the failure of language to adequately 
ÔmanageÕ 9-11, it is unsurprising the events generated a void within which the 
construction of 9-11 as crisis would have to occur.
13
 
 
Within the context of the void, the agency of politicians, the media and the general 
public was brought to the fore.  The agency of the media and foreign policy 
practitioners was especially crucial in framing 9-11 given the lack of competing 
discursive structures.
14
  The dominant framings of the events and the construction of 
9-11 as crisis were not inevitable, but instead relied on the strategic agency of foreign 
policy practitioners and the media.  The agency of the general public was similarly 
significant, initially as the level of meaning production shifted to the individual Ð with 
Ôlatent narrativesÕ emerging as the dominant sense-making mechanism Ð and 
increasingly as ÔviewersÕ evaluated cultural expectations with reference to emerging 
official framings of 9-11.  While startlingly widespread, resonance was not 
unanimous.  Important dissenting voices were heard.  As stressed in chapter 2, in a 
democracy such as the US, going to war is such a costly exercise that it requires 
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 A security culture is a shared body of assumptions, belief and norms, as well as associated practices, 
related to the security of the state and/or other social actors.  Security cultures are thus Ôpatterns of 
thought and argumentation that establish pervasive and durable security preferences by formulating 
concepts of the role, legitimacy and efficacy of particular approaches to protecting values.  Through a 
process of socialization, security cultures help establish the core assumptions, beliefs and values of 
decision-makersÕ and the general public about Ôhow security challenges can and should be dealt withÕ 
and, more fundamentally, about what is a security challenge or what is likely to become one.  This 
definition is developed from Williams, P. ÔFrom Non-intervention to Non-indifference: the Origins and 
Development of the African UnionÕs Security CultureÕ, African Affairs, 106:42, (2007), pp.253-279, at 
p.256.   
14
 Barnett argues that framing takes on heightened significance where numerous competing discourses 
are evident.  It is equally important to note the increased pertinence of framing when there is a lack of 
competing discourses.  See, Barnett, ÔCultureÕ, pp.5-36; and chapter II of this thesis for discussion. 
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Ôwidespread public consent or at least acquiescenceÕ.
15
  Official framings drew upon 
the cultural condition of the void and widely understood foreign policy traditions to, 
very effectively, maximise popular resonance.  As the construction of 9-11 as crisis 
gained popular resonance, harmonising and regulating the meaning of the events, the 
void was filled and 9-11 retrospectively became a moment the world changed.  
 
 
Void 
 
Failure of Discourse 
 
Why is it that analyses of 9-11 so often begin with personal reflections and 
recollections of the events which unfolded that day?
16
  It is unusual for academic 
analyses to begin in such a way.  Firstly, perhaps, it is because the (immediately 
perceived and retrospectively afforded) scale, significance and nature of the events 
are such that 9-11 is a date for which people can recall what happened, where they 
were and their personal experience of the day.  Crucially, however, this importance 
has coupled with an explanation of 9-11 founded on the (paradoxical) assumption that 
the events are inexplicable.  Diken and Lausten lament the fact that 9-11 has been 
elevated to a level of Absolute Evil, similarly to the Holocaust.
17
  This elevation 
places the events beyond the potential for understanding.  Once regarded as pure evil, 
analysing and explaining 9-11 is seen as futile, impossible and even as apologising for 
the conduct of evil.
18
  It is thus possible to see how, in the weeks and months after 9-
11, attempts to understand the events became equated with a lack of US patriotism.
19
  
Perhaps in implicit anticipation of a cacophony of disapproving voices, citing a lack 
of patriotism (the ultimate post 9-11 sin), authors have attempted to circumvent 
criticism by proving that they too recognise that the events cannot be understood 
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 See Jackson, Writing, pp.8, 20 on resonance. 
16
 See, for instance, John Lewis GaddisÕ opening account of the day and Laura ShepherdÕs article, 
which begins by recalling her whereabouts on 9-11.  Gaddis, Surprise; Shepherd, L. 'Visualising 
violence: legitimacy and authority in the 'war on terror'', Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1:2, (2008), 
pp.213-226..  In critical geopolitics, see, Agnew, ÔNot the WretchedÕ. 
17
 Diken and Lausten, The Culture of Exception. 
18
 On the political implications of naming ÔevilÕ see, for example, Krebs and Lobasz, ÔFixing the 
Meaning of 9-11Õ, pp.427-429. 
19
 This has been widely discussed in discourse-oriented works analysing the ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  See, for 
example, Butler, Precarious Life. 
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through objective analysis and that they must revert to the smallest scale of 
understanding, the individual, in order to recreate the events of 9-11.  In short, 
because (as will be shown) 9-11 has been constructed as inexplicable, analyses have 
tacitly recognised this through an unusual tendency to begin academic inquiry with 
personal accounts and recollections of the day. 
 
Secondly, analyses of 9-11 are personalised because that is how the events were 
ÔlivedÕ.  9-11 was not widely foreseen; it came as a shock to the American people and 
the watching world.
20
  Established truths of US security culture were disproved as 
symbols of US political and economic strength were successfully targeted.  
Witnessing large-scale carnage on US soil invalidated notions of anarchy and chaos 
existing outside of America.  Whether the outside had permeated the inside Ð and 
history had returned to the US Ð or the inside was turning in on itself was not 
immediately known.
21
  This incomprehensibility, the lack of certainty over what the 
events were Ð what they meant, symbolised and implied Ð arose due to the difficulty, 
and often impossibility, of subsuming the events within existing frameworks of 
intelligibility.   
 
The lack of appropriate discourse(s) to make sense of 9-11 in its immediate aftermath 
meant that where cues were taken they came from unofficial sources and ÔlowerÕ 
levels of cultural life.  Religion, films and personal forms of knowledge were drawn 
upon as viewers struggles to comprehend 9-11 took place at the level of the individual 
in contrast to the more commonplace intersubjective understandings that are produced 
through discursive regularities.  As Hansen summarises, discourses regulate the 
production of meaning in a relatively systematic way where language becomes 
comparatively stable.
22
  Unable to be incorporated into existing discourses, the events 
of 9-11 were quite literally ÔunspeakableÕ: language failed.
23
  Personal understandings 
substituted for the lack of a discourse capable of persuasively articulating the events 
                                                
20
 ÔShockÕ, ÔshockedÕ and ÔshockingÕ were repeatedly used by interviewees to describe the events of 9-
11.  Gaddis uses the word ÔsurpriseÕ to encapsulate the unexpected nature of events; Meyer uses the 
analogy of the US as an island; while Crockatt compares 9-11 to the shock experienced at the end of 
the Cold War.  Gaddis, Surprise, p.1; Meyer, DC Confidential, pp.182-207; Crockatt, America 
Embattled, ch.1. 
21
 For instance, Croft talks of the violence of the (foreign) outside spilling into the (domestic 
American) inside.  Croft, Culture, p.37. 
22
 Hansen, Security, pp.18-23. 
23
 Steinert, ÔUnspeakable September 11
th
Õ, pp.651-665. 
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and fixing a shared meaning.  As Callahan et al. argue, Ôin lieu of a clearly posited 
narrative, human thought is structured by the latent narrative that emerges from the 
individualÕs underlying story about the way the world operates. Thus oneÕs own latent 
narrative emerges as the sense-making mechanism if no other coherent narrative is 
profferedÕ.
24
  These latent narratives drew upon personal experiences alongside wide 
and varied popular cultural sources in an attempt to inscribe meaning onto events.
25
  
Personal accounts of 9-11 and the heightened use of popular cultural sources to 
generate meaning thus reflect the fact that both the media and political elites fell silent 
in the face of an event which could not readily be incorporated into pre-existing 
foreign policy discourse(s).  Succinctly, personal accounts are symptomatic of the 
discursive void induced by 9-11 and the subsequent re-construction of that void, 
which occurred with the elevation of 9-11 to a position of Absolute Evil as part of the 
articulation of crisis.   
 
 
Silence and Security Culture 
  
ÔSuddenly, a sleek silvery flying object appeared from the left-hand side of the 
TV screen, approaching the other Twin Tower. Before the eye could recognize 
it as a passenger airplane (or even if it did, the mind obstinately refused to 
acknowledge it), it violently penetrated the upper third of the building and 
disappeared in a red-orange-and-black ball of fire surging against the crispy 
blue autumnal skyÕ.26   
 
The official assessment of 9-11 records the fact that the events could happen as Ôa 
failure of imaginationÕ.27  Arva recalls that even as the events unfolded they were hard 
to imagine.  Firstly, for ÔviewersÕ, this generated disbelief: ÒI couldnÕt believe itÓ;
28
 ÒI 
didnÕt believe it atÓ.
29
  Secondly, it inspired denial:  
                                                
24
 Callahan, K. Dubnick, M. and Olshfski, D. ÔWar Narratives: Framing Our Understanding of the War 
on TerrorÕ, Public Administration Review, 66:4, (2006), pp.554-568, at pp.562-563. 
25
 See Croft, Culture, for a detailed account of how popular cultural sources were used to fix the 
meaning of 9-11. 
26
 Arva, E. ÔLife as Showtime: Aesthetic Images and Ideological SpectaclesÕ, Perspectives on Evil and 
Human Wickedness, 1:2 (2003), p.64. 
27
 Kean, T. and Hamilton, L. The 9-11 Commission Report: final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: Norton, 2004). 
28
 Melody, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR202, 18 September 2001). 
29
 Branden Hayden, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR086, 20 September 2001). 
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ÒI was overwhelmed.  It seemed like something from a movie.  It could not be 
real; it had to be something from a movie É I knew it was real, but a part of 
me didnÕt want to believe itÓ.
30
 
Ò[I]t couldnÕt be true, it had to be HollywoodÓ.
31
 
Having Ôno correspondence in the existing discourse of the timeÕ, events were met 
with a mixture of disbelief and denial.
32
  This led to a situation in which, although 
clearly significant as they contradicted the widely held view that the US was Ôexempt 
from this kind of violenceÕ,
33
 the events could not be articulated and were thus 
relatively meaning-less.  As one interviewee described it, Òthe weight of imaginingÓ 
was too great; there were no words:
34
 
 ÒIt was unspeakableÓ.
35
 
ÒWhat stands out is the lack of information thatÕs being given to the media, by 
the media, to the peopleÓ.
36
  
Ò[It] made it difficult to talk É speaking clearly wasnÕt really happening at 
that point, it was very difficultÓ.
37
 
The effect of this inability to articulate the events Ð to place them within an existing 
foreign policy discourse Ð was to prevent an understanding of them.  Confusion, 
numbness and a void in meaning dominated the immediate experience of 9-11 for 
many watching Americans: 
Ò[It was] so unbelievable that it didnÕt want to sink inÓ.
38
 
ÒAt first I wasnÕt angry, because I couldnÕt believe what was happeningÓ.
39
 
ÒI felt nothing because I couldnÕt understandÓ.
40
 
 
Where partial understandings were achieved, rather than from foreign policy 
discourse, they were generally taken from popular cultural sources.  Science fiction, 
                                                
30
 Hays Ginn, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR087, 27 September 2001). 
31
 Hunter Farrell, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR321, 22 October 2001). 
32
 Peker, E. ÔFollowing 9-11: George W, BushÕs Discursive Re-articulation of American Social 
IdentityÕ, unpublished thesis, Department of Management and Economics, Linkpings Universitet, 
(2006), p.34. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Hunter Farrell, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR321, 22 October 2001). 
35
 Dan Hiller, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR381, 15 September 2001). 
36
 Adeel Merson, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR381, 15 September 2001). 
37
 Naree Bisson, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR144, 11 October 2001). 
38
 Karl Day, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR101, 2 October 2001). 
39
 Daniel Dominguez, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR247, 8 October 2001). 
40
 Kyoko Sato, ÔWitness and ResponseÕ (SR247, 16 October 2001). 
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horror shows and movies, as well as songs, poems and religious faith were all drawn 
upon to fill the events with meaning.   
Ò[It was] so sci-fiÓ.
41
 
Ò[M]y mind went to ÔWar of the WorldsÕÓ.
42
 
ÒI didnÕt believe it at first É I was waiting for the lights to go up and some 
director to say ÔcutÕ or something.  It was like out of a movie; like 
Independence DayÓ.
43
 
ÒIt was like something out of a horror showÓ,
44
 
Citizens turned to personal levels of understanding and popular cultural sources of 
meaning due to the lack of prevalent discourses capable of adequately articulating the 
events.  Ô[I]n countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the media 
are a part of the co-production of security discourse.Õ
45
  ÔIn the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, however, commentators struggled to establish adequate historical frames of 
reference, that is, to place Ômedia templatesÕ over the unfolding coverage to shape 
explanationsÕ.
46
  In fact, the incomprehensibility of 9-11 was reinforced by the media, 
through images (on television, in newspapers and magazines of witnesses to the event 
Ôlooking speechlesslyÉ in lieu of languageÕ.
47
   
 
 
ÔVoicelessÕ images and the media hush more generally were compounded by elected 
representatives as a Ôstrangely ominous silence filled the discursive space where 
political declarations were expectedÕ.
48
  9-11 fell outside of prevalent existing 
discourses; it could not easily be subsumed within the definitions, parameters and 
storylines of existing frameworks of intelligibility.  Both the media and political elites 
refrained or were unable to place the events into a meaningful and coherent discourse; 
thus, the two principal (and expected) generators of meaning fell silent.  This lack of 
an appropriate language, the silence of elected representatives and the resulting 
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sparsity of background understanding for witnesses to contextualise the events left 
Americans ÔbaffledÕ.
49
 
 
John Troyer, writing only seventeen days after 9-11, encapsulates the nature of the 
void and the feeling that ÔSeptember 11 strode onstage without lines, without script, 
without characterÕ:
50
  
ÔI have read the same story, in different news sources, attempting to create a 
language that adequately describes the events. While every term imaginable to 
describe violence, death, grief and anxiety is still in use by most Americans, 
the words are not helping to make sense of the situation É this persistent 
repetition of language [generates] a frustration about the inability to accurately 
define a 17-day-long stream of transient information.   
The language of everyday life seems entirely irrelevant given the inability to 
even categorize Sept. 11, 2001, as anything other than Sept. 11, 2001 É Sept. 
11, 2001, is a singular day that resides in the present without a proper name, 
embedding no specific meanings other than that words do not adequately 
articulate the shock ... The accustomed uses of language to make impossible 
events seem real for the American public via television, newspaper and radio 
sources are breaking down.Õ
51
 
TroyerÕs article is incredibly erudite given the general lack of critical analysis that 
existed in the immediate wake of 9-11.
52
  With hindsight, Troyer raises three 
important points.  Firstly, Troyer recognises that attempts in the media to cover and 
understand events fuelled incomprehensibility.  As the Bush administration set about 
narrating the response, and constructing crisis, ÔincomprehensibilityÕ became a widely 
accepted feature of 9-11 and was incorporated into the official foreign policy 
discourse of the response.  The void Ð as a void in meaning Ð was actually used in the 
construction of the response as, through foreign policy discourse, 9-11 went from 
being incomprehensible to inexplicable.  Secondly, in noting the breakdown of Ôthe 
accustomed uses of languageÕ, Troyer highlights the failings of Ôofficial politicsÕ and 
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the shift to Ôthe politicalÕ that 9-11 wrought.
53
   Thirdly, TroyerÕs use of ÔSept. 11 
2001Õ is striking in its unfamiliarity.  The dominant shorthand abbreviation has 
become (an almost universally adopted) Ô9-11Õ.  Ô9-11Õ has come to act as a somatic 
marker of crisis.
54
  Before turning to explore the second and third points in theorising 
the construction of crisis, the first observation requires further elaboration. 
 
The void that 9-11 created resulted from two primary factors: the shattering of the 
foundational myths of US security culture and the resulting silence of both the media 
and political elites. ÔViolence of this magnitude collided with, and mutually excluded, 
almost two hundred years, the subconscious reality and awareness of being isolated 
from a chaotic world.Õ
55
  The security culture of the US has propagated a belief in 
invulnerability.  Sheltered behind two vast oceans,
56
 the US as a self-perceived Ôisland 
exempt from this kind of violence, witnessing it only from the safe distance of the TV 
screenÕ became Ôdirectly involvedÕ on September 11
th
, 2001; Ôold security seemed to 
be momentarily shatteredÕ.
57
   
 
The shattering of American security culture was foremost in shaping the reactions of 
the general public to 9-11.  As interviewee Eric Offner noted, the experience of 9-11 
Òhas to be set off against what one has been conditioned toÓ.
58
  People were 
Òcompletely shocked it was a terrorist attackÓ
59
 precisely because Americans Òhad no 
contact with thatÓ.
60
  The fact that 9-11 occurred in America was what generated 
much of intervieweesÕ incomprehension: 
ÒI canÕt believe it É itÕs happening here, in the US.  You see these things out 
there, but not here in your own countryÓ.
61
 
ÒIÕm still in a state of shock; I donÕt believe this could happen on American 
soilÓ.
62
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Ò[Y]ou know in our country we have never been actually threatened, except 
for one timeÓ.
63
 
 
Americans were accustomed to seeing images of chaos, violence and terrorism Ôout 
thereÕ, but not ÔhereÕ.  American security culture located the dangers of anarchy away 
from the US both geographically and historically.  Often, images of 9-11 were greeted 
with spatial or temporal distanciation, perceived either as Ònews from some other 
countryÓ
64
 or with the assumption that Òit was something in historyÓ.
65
  Although 
witnessing the destruction of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on fire, the events 
remained difficult to comprehend, as no overarching official discourse existed to fix 
meaning to them.  Rather, US security culture was dominated by an illusion of 
invulnerability that had flourished during the Ôinterwar yearsÕ following the Cold 
War.
66
  ÔThe indispensable nationÕ was increasingly accustomed to enjoying the 
confidence and security of its Ôunipolar momentÕ.  This confidence culminated in the 
myth that the US was untouched and untouchable.
67
  9-11, interpreted accordingly, 
destroyed that myth, and shattered the truths of American security culture. 
ÒI did not really believe it because we live in the United States and basically 
the whole concept of living in the United States is freedom, living in a very 
sheltered world where you just never would think of a war, or attack É I have 
always felt safe in America É [now] I donÕt know if I could necessarily say if 
I am safe É a lot of people in America were feeling so secure, they were 
feeling like the US is invincible É we are not invincible É we need to get out 
of our bubble and realise that we are just in the same ballpark as everyone 
elseÓ.
68
 
Ò[I] couldnÕt believe it; these are people, these are Americans É Americans 
think weÕre invulnerable, weÕre like superman, you know?  WeÕre too good 
for that É we, as anyone else, can be affected by these eventsÓ.
69
 
Ò[T]his has made everyone open their eyes É We are not invincibleÓ.
70
 
ÒWe no longer appear to be chosen people.  We are just as susceptible to mass 
devastation as any other part of the worldÓ.
71
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That such enduring, deeply held assumptions about the nature of American security 
were so obviously disproved caused widespread alarm and made talking of the events 
difficult.  ÔThe emergence of events which could not be domesticated, symbolised or 
integrated within the discourseÕ caused both foreign policy practitioners and the 
media (the two expected sources of meaning) to fall silent.
72
  However, as the 
response was formulated this incomprehensibility Ð the impossibility of incorporating 
9-11 into the logic of an existing foreign policy discourse Ð was seized upon.  The 
media and foreign policy practitioners worked in symbiosis to transform an 
incomprehensible event into an inexplicable event. 9-11 went from making no sense, 
to being beyond any justification and impervious to understanding.  As Morris 
summarises: 
ÔRepetitious broadcasting also made [the events] resistant to analysis. 
Saturating every television screen, they seemed to testify only to the 
incomprehensibility of the event/image. This was quickly mobilized for 
ideological effect, so that the incomprehensibility of the image/event also 
became a way of conveying the idea that the terrorist act is that which exceeds 
moral calculation ... the event quickly became its image, and questions of 
causality were consequently deferred along with the need for reading. The 
substitution was made possible by virtue of those other substitutions on which 
photographic logics rest: of appearance for truth, of what can be seen for what 
can be known.Õ
73
  
 
The manipulation of the void by foreign policy practitioners and the media in the 
discourse of the response is an important and infrequently acknowledged move.  
Where scholars, such as Diken and Lausten, do criticise the policing of Ôacceptable 
knowledgeÕ of the events, rarely are the initial factors that gave rise to this situation 
considered.
74
  The context of the void Ð as a void in meaning Ð provided the situation 
in which such a construction was possible.  Drawing on the widely perceived belief 
that 9-11 defied existing understandings (of America, the world and their 
relationship), the construction of 9-11 confirmed that the events were indeed beyond 
the parameters of understanding.  By transforming 9-11 from an incomprehensible 
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event to an inexplicable attack, numerous features of the response were naturalised.
75
  
This transformation was one, particularly important, framing of 9-11 that underpinned 
a series of subsequent discursive moves.  These moves helped to render a contingent 
response common sense and began by reaffirming the mastery of politics over the 
political by constructing 9-11 as a somatic marker of crisis.   
 
 
Crisis 
 
Reinstating Politics 
 
ÔPoliticsÕ, for Jenny Edkins, marks the arena of Ôelections, political parties, the doings 
of governments and parliaments, the state apparatus, and in the case of international 
politics, treaties, international agreements, diplomacy, wars, institutions of which 
states are members and the actions of statesmen and women.Õ
76
  ÔThe politicalÕ, on the 
other hand, Ôhas to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a 
particular, historically specific account of what counts as politics and defines other 
areas of social life as not politicsÕ.
77
  ÔSeptember 11 has been one of these situations 
of the political that suspended, though temporarily, the stable arena of politicsÕ.
78
  For 
Peker, the 9-11 void saw Ôthe disintegration of discursive structures, social meanings, 
and subject positions; where hegemonic intervention to rearticulate them surface[d] as 
an urgent necessityÕ.
79
  It was, for Peker, Ôthe moment of global crisis overcome by 
the act of founding a new harmonyÕ.
80
  This interpretation, however, belies the 
construction that resides in the identification of crisis; constructing a crisis was, in 
fact, the first stage of the response, not the condition upon which the response was 
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formulated.  Moreover, it was only with the founding of a new ÔharmonyÕ Ð the 
articulation of a new trajectory Ð that 9-11 was retrospectively constituted as crisis. 
ÔThe concept of ÔcrisisÕ is most welcome in this sense because it represents a 
situation in which our everyday beliefs of how the world works are rigorously 
disrupted by an event that is out of our control.  In that sense, it can be 
compared to trauma, i.e. a situation that is hard to describe and yet demands to 
be communicated: Ô... it is outside the frameworks of normal social reality and 
thus outside the linguistic and other symbolic tools we have at our disposal for 
making sense of the worldÕÕ.
81
 
This Ôdemand to be communicatedÕ and the Ôurgent necessityÕ of articulating are 
central to an understanding of 9-11 as crisis.  It has been argued that 9-11 generated a 
discursive void as the events could not readily be subsumed into existing foreign 
policy discourse.  However, 9-11, in and of itself, was not a crisis.  Initially 
unregulated by discourse, the ÔeventsÕ did not mean anything for certain.  Instead 9-11 
became a crisis through a process of discursive construction which reinstated 
ÔpoliticsÕ over Ôthe politicalÕ. Crises, I argue, are constructed. 
 
Using EdkinÕs terminology, 9-11 was a Ôpolitical momentÕ.  A political moment is a 
founding, open and contingent moment in which the political order and community 
are constituted. In this moment ÔactsÕ are foundationless: they are just ÔactsÕ.
82
  
Crucially, however, the constructed meaning of ÔactsÕ and the newly forged political 
reality are veiled in the writing of history; the openness of the interregnum ends with 
the re-establishment of politics over the political and this re-establishment demands 
the process of establishing becomes retrospectively invisible.
83
  To become invisible, 
foundational myths of the new political reality must be widely accepted.
84
  With such 
resonance, the ascription of meaning to acts, the re-establishing of politics over the 
political and the very contingency of the interregnum are forgotten.  Re-opening the 
contingency of the 9-11 void is an important step to understanding how the new 
political reality of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was possible; it requires an appreciation of the 
process of constructing 9-11 as a crisis, a process which filled the ÔactsÕ with meaning 
and, crucially, articulated the solution.  
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So what is a crisis?  9-11 was not, self-evidently, a crisis.  9-11 became a moment of 
crisis.  However, as I have argued, 9-11 did herald a discursive void as the ÔAmerican 
post-cold-war security order discourse collapsed under the new challengeÕ and the 
Ôexpected sourcesÕ of meaning fell silent.
85
  Despite the silence that followed such a 
stark disproving of the previously perceived certainties of US security culture, 9-11 
Ôdemanded resolution through a new understandingÕ.
86
  This demand was met through 
a Ôdiscursive shift ... initiated by those with social power [and] reproduced by 
othersÕ.
87
  The new policies of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ were set under way not by the 
ÔactsÕ or ÔeventsÕ of 9-11 themselves, but through the discursive construction of 9-11 
as crisis by those with social power.  Elected representatives, as foreign policy 
practitioners, acted as issuers of statements in a Foucauldian sense; they acted as 
ÔexpertsÕ whose words spoke truth.  These statements drew on each other, supported 
each other and together comprised a logical and coherent system of statements that 
regulated meaning in a coherent way.
88
  This system of statements (an emerging and 
solidifying discourse) proffered foundational myths and meta-narratives capable of 
subsuming the events, re-constructing the political order and the political community.  
All of this was crucial to the unfolding ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  It belies, however, the 
double articulation at the heart of the initial construction of 9-11 as crisis: the 
simultaneous identification of both the problem and the solution.  9-11 was a political 
moment; sovereignty, which had been so bluntly put into question through the use of 
illegitimate violence, was reasserted and performed.  It was also, however, 
retrospectively constituted as a moment of both dusk and dawn;
89
 9-11 became an 
historical moment, a moment of crisis, when events marked the end of one era and the 
start of the next.  9-11 was interpreted and constructed as a day when the world 
changed.
90
  Articulating this change and the new era required a decisive intervention, 
without which 9-11 could not have been constructed as a crisis.  
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Decisive Intervention 
 
The term ÔcrisisÕ is frequently deployed, rhetorically rich and attention grabbing; it 
Ôhas an immense lay, media and academic currencyÕ.
91
  However, the term is also 
Ôillusive, vague, imprecise, malleable, open-ended and generally unspecifiedÕ.
92
  Hay 
suggests that the termÕs ubiquity may even derive from Ôthis notorious imprecisionÕ.
93
  
In social and political academic literature, the term is frequently understood as Ôan 
accumulation of contradictionsÕ.
94
  To understand crisis as a process and product of 
discursive construction, Hay turns to consider the etymology of the term in an attempt 
to Ôinject some (long overdue) conceptual clarityÕ.
95
  Tracing ancient Greek usage of 
the term, Hay notes that crisis was invoked to describe Ôthe moment in the course of 
the disease at which it is determined whether the patient will recoverÕ.
96
  Thus the 
Ôcontradictory constellation, is however, held to represent an opportunity for a healing 
transformationÕ.
97
   
 
Crisis appears perhaps most frequently in Marxist, neo-Marxist and post-Marxist state 
theory.
98
  It is here that crisis is most frequently identified as a self-evident 
accumulation of contradictions.  Hay rejects this Ôdominant and purely objectivist 
view of crisis, which conflates, and in certain cases actually equates, contradiction 
and crisisÕ.
99
  In tracing the etymology of crisis, Hay identifies crises as a moment of 
objective contradiction and subjective intervention.
100
  Whilst the assertion of 
Ôobjective contradictionÕ derives from HayÕs ontological position, Ôthe crucial point is 
that a given constellation of contradictions can sustain a multitude of differing and 
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incommensurate conceptions of crisisÕ.
101
  Thus, a crisis is a strategic moment;
102
 the 
events of 9-11 had to be perceived and constructed as a rupture, but simultaneously, 
9-11 was Ôperceived as a moment in which a decisive intervention can, and perhaps 
must, be madeÕ.
103
  This perception must occur at the level at which the crisis is 
identified; by actors capable of delivering a response to the problems they identify.
104
  
In short, to be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 required a decisive intervention to be 
made, which articulated the events Ôas ÔsymptomÕ-atic of a more general condition of 
crisisÕ
105
 and a ÔWar on TerrorÕ, conducted through the agency of the American 
military led by President Bush, as the solution to the impasse. 
 
ÔA crisis is therefore itself constructed in and through social interaction.  It is 
given meaning through social processes, through a decisive intervention which 
gives meaning to the situation and which also provide a route for future 
policy.  That is, there are no objective ontological criteria that a crisis must 
fulfil to be a crisis: a crisis is one when it permeates discourse, and creates 
new understandings and, thereby, new policy programmesÕ.
106
 
 
ÔCrisis, then, is a moment and process of transformationÕ; the shifting of historical 
epochs is written in the construction of crises.
107
  ÔIf we are to understandÕ the project 
of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ that followed Ôwe must start by considering the moment of 
crisis itselfÕ.
108
  Crisis, like the subsequent stages of the response that would lead to 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo, is Ôsubjectively perceived and hence brought into 
existence through narrative and discourseÕ.
109
  The possibility of the state imposing a 
new foreign policy trajectory Ôresides not only in the ability to respond to crises, but 
to identify, define and constitute crisisÕ.
110
  The ÔrightÕ and ÔabilityÕ to impose such a 
new trajectory relied upon the success of the articulation of the events of 9-11 Ð as 
symptomatic of a wider crisis Ð and on the success of the articulation of the decisive 
intervention that deemed a ÔWar on TerrorÕ as urgent.   
                                                
101
 Hay, C. ÔCrisis and political development in post-war BritainÕ, in Marsh, D. et al., Postwar British 
Politics in Perspective, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p.91, cited in Croft, Culture, p.57. 
102
 Hay, ÔNarrating CrisisÕ, p.254. 
103
 Hay, ÔCrisis and structural transformationÕ, p.323. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Hay, ÔNarrating CrisisÕ, p.254. 
106
 Croft, Culture, p.5. 
107
 Hay, ÔNarrating CrisisÕ, p.255. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Ibid. 
 21 
 
To be ÔsuccessfulÕ constructions of crisis, which compete with each other, must 
achieve resonance with key populations.
111
  Bush achieved considerable resonance in 
narrating a crisis discourse.  He did Ôa remarkable job of defining the attacks of 
September 11 to his advantageÕ.
112
  BushÕs framing of a crisis discourse was Ôa key 
factor in his successÕ, elevating him from a perceived poor leader to an increasingly 
popular wartime President.
113
    This resonance was aided by the scale and shock of 9-
11 combined with the relative paucity of alternative crisis narratives; the void 
strategically selected in favour of the construction of crisis mobilised by the Bush 
government.  Hay notes that Ôcrisis discourses operate by identifying minor alterations 
in the routine texture of social lifeÕ, iterative changes are recruited by the discourse 
and presented as symptomatic of the general condition of crisis.
114
  Just as the void 
operated as a highly individualised lived experience, as is reflected in the nature of 
personal testaments and widely located popular cultural sources of meaning, the 9-11 
crisis became lived in the terms articulated in the crisis discourse.
115
   With 9-11, 
clearly social life was impacted, foreign policy practitioners did not have to work hard 
to accrue incremental changes in everyday life symptomatic of a wider crisis 
condition; the hole in the cityscape and trauma that followed ensured a sense of 
rupture was easily established.
116
  The crisis, like the void before it, was lived at a 
relatively (unusually and surprisingly) personal level.
117
  The major difference from 
the void to the crisis arose in the harmonisation of meaning across the population; if 
on 11 September the events of the day were relatively meaning-less, in the days that 
followed, the meaning of 9-11 was increasingly homogenous and hegemonic.
118
  Only 
three days after the events, the general public began to read and articulate 9-11 
through emerging official discourse(s): 
Ò[It] was an attack on our society, on our way of life É an attack on free life 
in generalÓ.
119
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Even though 9-11 was initially meaning-less, the ÔnatureÕ of 9-11 selected for and 
against certain constructions, in exactly the same manner as the wider context of 
foreign policy culture and the domestic political landscape.
120
  Just as Gerard Toal 
notes that it was unsurprising for Bush to reach into foreign policy culture and re-
articulate enduring or forgotten foreign policy discourses, the attacks, whilst 
contingent, made certain courses of action more likely (and possess a greater chance 
of resonating widely) than others.
121
  ÔDiscursive constructions of crisis are doubly 
constrained by the ÔsymptomsÕ it must narrate and by its ability to find resonance with 
the experiences to which such symptoms give riseÕ.
122
  This is why the 
incomprehensible nature of 9-11 in the void fed so well into the inexplicable nature of 
9-11 constructed in the crisis discourse.  The success of a crisis discourse depends not 
on an ability to accurately map the complexity of perceived webs of causation Ð it is 
of course to the constructions of crisis, not some extra-discursive ÔrealityÕ of failure 
that narratives must attest to Ð but Ôon their ability to provide a simplified account 
sufficiently flexible to ÔnarrateÕ a great variety of morbid symptoms whilst 
unambiguously attributing causality and responsibilityÕ.
123
  In this, the ÔWar on 
TerrorÕ, as a discursive project, excelled. 
 
Before subsuming new events into its narrative, the first events that the emerging (and 
increasingly hegemonic) discourse had to account for were previous instances of 
Ôterrorist evilÕ.  The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks on US 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole were quickly 
incorporated within the emerging dominant discourse.  The construction of a 
chronological lineage of events leading up to 9-11 was so strong that interviewees 
noted it was Òstartling [that people] didnÕt link [the] previous É pattern of 
activitiesÓ.
124
  Crucially however, certain Ômorbid symptomsÕ were deliberately 
excluded by the official discourse.  The agency of the general public to interpret, 
modify, reject and resist the official response is of course important to acknowledge.  
While the official discourse was widely accepted, alternatives were proffered.  Those 
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voicing alternative interpretations of 9-11 were more likely to draw parallels to the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing than instances of Ôforeign terrorismÕ or even Pearl 
Harbor.
125
 
 
The response of the general public was at times particularly erudite, and amounted to 
a form of resistance to the emerging official foreign policy discourse: 
Ò[All President Bush] uses are buzz words like evil, good, resolve and youÕd 
think he was talking about a Star Wars movie or somethingÓ.
126
 
ÒBush said É ÔWar on TerrorismÕ É [itÕs a] contradiction in termsÓ.
127
 
Nonetheless, the emerging official discourse resonated widely in both its ability to fill 
the void with meaning and to incorporate new events within it.  Elements of official 
discourse were widely repeated by interviewees when discussing the US and the new 
enemy; nationalism and unity were paramount, opposed to a denigrated, subhuman 
enemy:   
 ÒWeÕre dealing with people who have the mind of a snake; not human beings 
É WeÕre in a different world; weÕre in a free world É we donÕt think that 
way É very cowardice É thereÕs no sense of humanity whatsoever  ... WeÕre 
not barbaric; weÕre just not that sort of peopleÓ.
128
 
ÒHow can they live among us and not see kindness?Ó
129
 
ÒTheyÕre substandard people É theyÕre subhuman É anti-human É from a 
diseased corner of the world É with a diseased mindsetÓ.
130
 
The strength of patriotic feeling generated after 9-11 was reflected in the question, ÒIf 
not, why are you not flying the flag?Ó
131
  Flying the flag was now the default position.  
Not doing so made a larger and louder statement than doing so.
132
  Nevertheless, 
although ÔunityÕ and ÔfreedomÕ were increasingly used in opposition to ÔterrorÕ, there 
was a risk that the emerging official discourse would lose its grip with time.
 
 Two and 
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a half weeks after 9-11, one interviewee noted that ÒitÕs kind of wearing off É people 
are getting more É itÕs hit them already É and theyÕre slowing down É nothing else 
has really happenedÓ.
133
  The start of October, however, brought a series of Ôanthrax 
attacksÕ and numerous Ôwhite powder scaresÕ across the country.   
 
Just as certain past events, such as embassy bombings and the USS Cole, were 
incorporated within the increasingly dominant discourse, so too were new events.  
The official discourse was capable of narrating these new Ômorbid symptomsÕ as part 
of the underlying condition.  It is with the anthrax scares that it is possible to see the 
dominant discourse becoming increasingly hegemonic.  Far away from New York and 
Washington DC, Ôwhite powder scaresÕ were experienced, made sense of and 
commented on through the wider discourse of the emerging ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  By mid 
October in Newfoundland, Canada, after being detained in response to a Ôwhite 
powder scareÕ, one interviewee observed, Òthe war reached here É [we could] see it 
from the insideÓ.
134
  Successfully narrating the anthrax scares as new symptoms of the 
identified terror threat solidified the dominance of the official ÔWar on TerrorÕ 
discourse at a time when alternatives were forming in opposition to intervention in 
Afghanistan.
135
  The ability of the emerging official discourse to narrate old and new 
symptoms of crisis ensured its survival and dominance; it would not be until 2003 that 
the hegemony of meaning production in foreign policy discourse would once again 
come under significant challenge. 
 
 
Ô9-11Õ as Somatic Marker 
 
Drawing on William ConnollyÕs research in neurophysiology, Gerard Toal argues that 
Ô9-11Õ has come to act as a somatic marker.
136
  Succinctly, Toal argues that through 
our ÔbiophysicalÕ encounters with the world, humans mix the cultural into the 
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corporeal.  Where these mixtures of the cultural and corporeal come together somatic 
markers may occur.  For Connolly, a somatic marker is a Ôa culturally mobilized, 
corporeal disposition through which affect-imbued, preliminary orientations to 
perceptions and judgment scale down the material factored into cost-benefit analyses, 
principled judgments, and reflective experimentsÕ.
137
  Thus a somatic marker 
underpins higher-order thought and deliberation as an organising and categorising 
capacity.  As a mixture of the cultural and the biophysical, a somatic marker operates 
Ôbelow the threshold of reflection and structured by affect-saturated memory and Ògut 
feelingsÓ, it simplifies and speeds the process of calculative reasoning so that every 
decision is relatively instantaneous, rather than a rational-choice marathonÕ.
138
 
 
Here we come full circle as we see that the elevation of 9-11 to a position of Absolute 
Evil is facilitated through the somatic marker of Ô9-11Õ.  Connolly makes his 
argument by drawing on the example of the intense collective memories of the 
Holocaust held by many European Jews.  The term ÔHolocaustÕ acts as a somatic 
marker conjuring Ôcomplex memories on the higher, linguistic register and taps into 
the visceral dimension of the trauma, an intense set of feelings that gather in the gut, 
the muscles, and the pallor of the skinÕ.
139
  The intense collective memories held by 
many Americans of 9-11, experienced through the shared position as ÔviewersÕ, have 
frequently been triggered and invoked in the ensuing ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  ÔWhen people 
with such intense collective memories face new circumstances that trigger them, a set 
of dispositions to perception, feeling, interpretation, and action are called into 
playÕ.
140
  The set of dispositions to perception, feeling and action generated by the 
somatic marker of Ô9-11Õ serve to promote particular policies whilst marginalising 
others.   
 
In the ÔWar on TerrorÕ, speaking of Ô9-11Õ is to invoke Ôan obsessive collective 
experience of trauma and lossÕ that operates without the need for higher-order 
contemplation.
141
  Speaking of 9-11 in the ÔWar on TerrorÕ has been to unleash an 
                                                
137
 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p.35, cited in Toal, ÔJustÕ, p.858. 
138
 Toal, ÔJust out lookingÕ, p.858. 
139
 Connolly, Neuropolitics, p.35, cited in Toal, ÔJust out lookingÕ, p.858. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Toal, ÔJust out lookingÕ, p.858. 
 26 
Ôaffective tsunamiÕ.
142
  The dominance of official US foreign policy discourse in the 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ, including the hegemonic framing of 9-11, has ensured that speaking 
of 9-11 brings to the fore issues of resentment and desire.  Speaking of 9-11 is to 
speak of the desire to avenge an instance of Absolute Evil through the muscular 
reassertion of US sovereignty; 9-11 as a somatic marker is fixed with and brings forth 
the truths of Jacksonian America.
143
   
 
As was argued in chapter 3, Bush was comfortable with and adept at operating within 
the Jacksonian foreign policy tradition.  It is unsurprising that intervention in 
Afghanistan followed a Jacksonian logic of the counterpunch: of defending American 
honour.  The central tenets of Jacksonian foreign policy thinking were central to the 
official foreign policy discourse of the Bush administration.  Those who had failed to 
obey the rules were no longer protected by them; they must be brought to justice and 
they could be brought to justice in any way as they had forfeited their rights by decree 
of their actions.  Ô9-11Õ as somatic marker not only brought to the fore the notion of 
an instance of Absolute Evil, it also brought forward the solution: fight terrorism and 
kill terrorists.
144
  Ô9-11Õ as a somatic marker, memorialising a moment of crisis, 
invoked both the tragedy and the solution to prevent its reoccurrence.  In the ÔWar on 
TerrorÕ, Ô9-11Õ could be invoked to justify a hyper-masculinised, warrior culture in 
society and in foreign policy thinking.  The affect of Ô9-11Õ as somatic marker thus 
mirrors the wider societal shifts Susan Faludi astutely documents.
145
  These shifts 
were reflected not only in the need for John Kerry to Ôprove his metalÕ by attempting 
to out-hunt President Bush, but also in the increasingly harmonised meaning of 9-11 
and the solution to the crisis it now represented.  As the meaning of 9-11 began to 
harmonise, interviewees frequently espoused distinctly Jacksonian views: 
 ÒThis event spurned a lot of anger in me É I hope they get him, I hope they 
torture him ... As discomforting as it is for me, I want them to bomb the hell 
out of Afghanistan ... kill them allÓ.
146
 
ÒIf I was twenty IÕd be signing up for the army É I feel that we should deal 
with them accordingly, as to what they have done to our country É that type 
of people do not deserve to live É I think we should attack and take those 
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people out of this world É I donÕt think they deserve to live after what they 
have done to our countryÓ.
147
 
Ò[Our] main goal should be the eradication or locating of people 
responsibleÓ.
148
 
Ò[We should] take care of the situation no matter what the costs may be É 
World War, whatever É IÕm all for war É we need to strike back ten times 
harder than they struck us É by any means necessaryÓ.
149
 
ÒWe had to do something about it; we canÕt just sit back and let them punch us 
in the faceÓ.
150
 
Ò[We should] drop nuclear weapons on Ôem É Wipe Afghanistan off the face 
of the earthÓ.
151
 
ÒWe should quit pussyfooting around É when you go hunting, when you 
wound something, you donÕt leave it to sufferÓ.
152
 
 
The strength of feeling in the above quotations is simultaneously startling and entirely 
predictable.  They exemplify Jacksonian desires for retribution and the regaining of 
American honour through force.  They also demonstrate why saying Ô9-11Õ has been 
such a potent political tool during the ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  Opposing increased military 
spending, suggesting less bellicose and more dialogical approaches to foreign policy 
and arguing for the rights of those who have committed acts of terrorism are 
incredibly difficult stances to take when the topography of the debate is shaped by a 
particular framing of 9-11.  This framing elevated 9-11 to a position of Absolute Evil, 
similarly to the Holocaust.  Within this framing, 9-11 is not only inexplicable, 
attempts at understanding and explanation are threatening as they fail to recognise the 
need for assertive, pre-emptive foreign policy.
153
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By showing that the meaning of 9-11 and the response that followed are cultural not 
natural, this chapter attempts to demonstrate the contingency of foreign policy.  The 
construction of crisis identified both that 9-11 represented a critical underlying 
condition and the solution to confront and remedy it.  Outside of the US (and even 
amongst minorities within) this dominant construction was contested.  Whether or not 
9-11 is an instance of Absolute Evil; whether 9-11 can be analysed and understood; 
whether 9-11 was an act of war, an act of God, a crime, or something else; whether or 
not 9-11 was an attack on freedom, on capitalism, on a way of life, on a state or a 
civilisation; whether the perpetrators were barbarians; whether they acted alone or 
represented a state, a religion or a networked group; and whether the perpetrators and 
their associates are capable of compassion, reason or rational thought all influence the 
possible, logical and necessary response to the events of September 11
th
 2001.  Ô9-11Õ 
as somatic marker operates to inhibit the possibility and need for such considerations, 
severely curtailing the ability to contemplate and realise different courses of action.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The wrong (the disproving of perceived security truths) and the lack (the failure to 
narrate) were the twin arms of the void that held Americans in a stunned, silent 
embrace.  It cannot be happening (it is wrong, we are right) and it is not real (it does 
not fit within reality as we know it, it is unimaginable) came to epitomise these twin 
components of the void.  The shattering of deep and enduring truths of US security 
culture were compounded by the impossibility of existing, contemporary foreign 
policy discourses subsuming the events and the initial inability of foreign policy 
practitioners to narrate 9-11 from scratch.  The media too struggled to establish 
meaning, opting instead for looped images of the events and a drive to emphasise the 
very incomprehensibility of 9-11.  The events of 9-11 thus appeared to return history 
to the US, shattering politics and returning the political to American life.   
 
Succinctly, 9-11 created a discursive void; this Ôvoid in meaningÕ acted as a vacuum 
for the official foreign policy discourse that would follow in the response.
154
  The 
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analogy of a vacuum portrays the emptiness and the difficulty of talking in the void.  
It also helps us understand how official foreign policy discourse articulating the 
response entered the discursive vacuum, filling it almost instantly through 
dissemination, repetition and amplification.  The void was unwelcome as the lack of 
meaning created unease.  Hence the desire to fill it and (re)establish a compelling 
narrative was strong, helping to create a situation whereby the words of foreign policy 
practitioners took on heightened significance.  The nature of the void not only 
heightened the significance of the framing that grafted meaning onto 9-11, it also 
shaped the construction of crisis as the first stage of the response. 
 
Theorising crisis has raised three important points.  Firstly, crises are discursive but 
context dependent.  Crisis is Ôa processÕ, in which language dominates.
155
  Crises are 
not objective ÔfactsÕ that result from the accumulation of contradictions; they are 
subjective and thus rely on the discursive construction of events as symptomatic of a 
wider condition of crisis.  Contradiction, rupture and/or failure can sustain numerous 
competing constructions of crisis, but the context of the events and the wider 
domestic context strategically select for certain narrations over others.  The cultural 
condition that created the incomprehensibility of 9-11 in the void facilitated the 
discursive construction of 9-11 as inexplicable in the emerging discourse of the 
response. 
 
Secondly, as Ôthe most important instrument in crisis management is languageÕ, Ôthose 
who are able to define what the crisis is all about hold the key to defining the 
appropriate strategies for its resolutionÕ.
156
  Defining the solution is fundamental to 
the construction of crisis.  This solution depends on the display and re-location of 
agency through a decisive intervention; a decisive intervention and agency are central 
to the construction of crisis.  Narrating the events of 9-11 had to be coupled to a 
vision for a new foreign policy trajectory that would prevent their reoccurrence.  As 
Koselleck notes, Ôthe question of the historical future is inherent in the crisisÕ.
157
  In 
writing the solution and the direction of the future, the agency of foreign policy 
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practitioners is vitally important.  Moreover, the construction of 9-11 as crisis served 
to concentrate agency at the heart of government; Ôcrisis is a process in which the site 
of political decision-making shifts from the disaggregated institutions, policy 
communities, networks and practices of the state apparatus to the state as a centralised 
and dynamic agentÕ.
158
  The reassertion of politics over the political required the 
heightened concentration of state agency at the very centre of government.  In 
summary, despite being discursive, as evidenced in a decisive intervention, both 
context and agency are central to an understanding of crisis. 
 
Thirdly, the importance of discourse, context and agency to the construction of crises 
brings to the fore issues of framing.  The Bush government wielded considerable 
power in Ôthe ability to frame the discursive context within which political 
subjectivities are constituted and re-constitutedÕ.
159
  Alternative framings were 
possible, even if the context of 9-11 strategically selected for certain narratives.
160
  It 
seems self-evident that 9-11 was intimately related to the ÔWar on TerrorÕ, but this 
common sense must be made strange.  It was not inevitable that the ÔWar on TerrorÕ 
would follow 9-11.  Rather 9-11 had to first be constructed in a particular and 
contingent way.  This construction relied upon the articulation of 9-11 as crisis.  As 
Croft notes, Ôcrises are pivotal points in understanding the development of policyÕ; 
Ôthe war on terror emerged as the dominant discourse through the crisis of 2001Õ.
161
  
Theorising crisis is thus a necessary step towards understanding how the ÔWar on 
TerrorÕ was possible and contesting the policies and practices that comprise it.  This 
chapter has thus laid the foundations for a comparative analysis of coalition foreign 
policy discourse.  Chapter 5 analyses the foreign policy discourse of the response, 
begun and shaped by the construction of 9-11 as crisis. 
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